Free Speech, Shield Laws, Retraction Laws, Bankruptcy Courts, Bloggers Rights, Tonkon Torp Law Firm, Obsidian Finance Group, David Brown, Kevin Padrick, Patty Whittington, Ewan Rose, Kevin D. Padrick, Oregon Attorney General, Judge Marco Hernandez, Oregon Civil Lawsuit, Summit 1031 Bankruptcy, US Bankruptcy Trustee.
"Motion for New Trial in Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox
Eugene Volokh • January 5, 2012 2:08 am
Our local counsel Benjamin Souede (Angeli Law Group LLC) and I have just filed a motion for new trial in Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox.
As you may recall, the Nov. 30 opinion in that case concluded, among other things, that only members of the institutional media are entitled to certain First Amendment libel law protections.
The motion for new trial argues that the First Amendment applies equally to all who speak to the public, whether or not they belong to the institutional media. Here is Part I.A of our memorandum in support of the motion:
Even if plaintiffs were not public figures, defendant was still entitled to the protections of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment applies equally to the institutional press and to others who speak to the public: “We have consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.”
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In support of this holding, the Court favorably quoted five Justices’ opinions in a libel case — Dun &; Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 784 (1985) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting), and id. at 773 (White, J., concurring in judgment) — which expressly concluded that “in the context of defamation law, the rights of the institutional media are no greater and no less than those enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same activities,” id. at 784 (a view expressly approved by Justice White, id. at 773).
And the Court in Citizens United went on to specifically mention that its “‘reject[ion]’” of any greater protection for the institutional press over other speakers stemmed partly from the realities of the Internet age: “With the advent of the Internet and the decline of print and broadcast media, moreover, the line between the media and others who wish to comment on political and social issues becomes far more blurred.” 130 S. Ct. at 905–06.
Indeed, the principle that the institutional press and others who speak to the public have the same First Amendment rights has been applied by the Court in case after case since the 1930s. See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (stating that the freedom of the press “embraces pamphlets and leaflets” as well as “newspapers and periodicals,” and indeed “comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion”);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1964) (applying the same First Amendment protection to the newspaper defendant and to the non-media defendants who placed an advertisement in the newspaper); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (applying the rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to a speaker who was not a member of the institutional press);
Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357–58 (1965) (same, where the speaker was an arrestee who conveyed statements to the sheriff and to wire services alleging that his arrest stemmed from a “diabolical plot,” Henry v. Collins, 158 So.2d 28, 31 (Miss. 1963));
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 n.18 (1978) (rejecting the “suggestion that communication by corporate members of the institutional press is entitled to greater constitutional protection than the same communication by [non-institutional-press businesses]”); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669–70 (1991) (concluding that the press gets no special immunity from laws that apply to others, including laws — such as copyright law — that target communication);
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 & n.8 (2001) (concluding that, in deciding whether defendants could be held liable under statutes banning the redistribution of illegally intercepted telephone conversations, “we draw no distinction between the media respondents and [the non-institutional-media respondent],” and citing New York Times and First Nat’l Bank of Boston as support for that conclusion).
All the federal circuits that have considered the question have likewise held that the First Amendment defamation rules apply equally to the institutional press and to others who speak to the public. Flamm v. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Women, 201 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 2000); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 649 (3d Cir. 1980); Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 219 n.13 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011); In re IBP Confidential Bus. Documents Litig., 797 F.2d 632, 642 (8th Cir. 1986); Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 777 F.2d 1403, 1410 (10th Cir. 1985); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 734 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1975). As the Second Circuit put it in Flamm, “a distinction drawn according to whether the defendant is a member of the media or not is untenable,” even in private-figure cases. 201 F.3d at 149.
And while the Ninth Circuit has not specifically discussed the question, it has indeed cited Gertz even where a non-institutional-press speaker was involved. See Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 694 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Gertz for the proposition that a “private person who is allegedly defamed” must show “that the defamation was due to the negligence of the defendant,” in a case where the defendant was not a media organization).
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning with regard to the First Amendment newsgatherer’s privilege is instructive for First Amendment cases more generally. In Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit confronted the question whether the newsgatherer’s privilege applies only to the institutional press or also extends to book authors.
Plaintiffs argued that a person who was writing a book “has no standing to invoke the journalist’s privilege because book authors are not members of the institutionalized print or broadcast media.” Id. at 1293.
But the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected that view. It found “persuasive” “the Second Circuit’s reasoning” that “it makes no difference whether ‘[t]he intended manner of dissemination [was] by newspaper, magazine, book, public or private broadcast medium, [or] handbill’ because ‘“[t]he press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.”’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987), which in turn quoted Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)).
And the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[h]ence, the critical question for deciding whether a person may invoke the journalist’s privilege is whether she is gathering news for dissemination to the public,” id., not whether she is working for the institutional media.
The same reasoning applies to the First Amendment defamation law rules, which are even more clearly secured by First Amendment precedents than are the First Amendment journalist privilege rules. See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 531–32 (7th Cir. 2003) (taking the view that the Supreme Court’s First Amendment precedents do not in fact recognize a newsgatherer’s privilege).
Anyone who — like defendant — is disseminating material to the public is fully protected by the First Amendment precedents, whether or not she is a “member[] of the institutionalized print or broadcast media.”
Moreover, the Supreme Court cases cited above did not turn on whether the defendants were trained as journalists, were affiliated with news entities, engaged in fact-checking or editing, disclosed conflicts of interest, kept careful notes, promised confidentiality, went beyond just assembling others’ writings, or tried to get both sides of a story.
But see Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, 2011 WL 5999334, *5 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2011) (concluding that the defendant was not protected by Gertz because “[d]efendant fails to bring forth any evidence suggestive of her status as a journalist,” and that, “[f]or example, there is no evidence of (1) any education in journalism; (2) any credentials or proof of any affiliation with any recognized news entity; (3) proof of adherence to journalistic standards such as editing, fact-checking, or disclosures of conflicts of interest; (4) keeping notes of conversations and interviews conducted; (5) mutual understanding or agreement of confidentiality between the defendant and his/her sources; (6) creation of an independent product rather than assembling writings and postings of others;
or (7) contacting ‘the other side’ to get both sides of a story”). The First Amendment fully protects the partisan polemicists in Citizens United v. FEC, the political activist in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the self-interested bank in First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the disgruntled defendant in Henry v. Collins, the elected district attorney in Garrison, the activists in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, and the Jehovah’s Witness pamphleteers in Lovell v. City of Griffin. It equally fully protects defendant.
In footnotes from a few cases from 1979 to 1990, the Court did leave open the possibility that some of its First Amendment defamation rules would only apply to the institutional press. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 n.6 (1990). And a few other courts, including the Oregon Supreme Court, expressly held that such First Amendment defamation rules, and especially the Gertz v. Robert Welch protections, apply only to the institutional press. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Green, 593 P.2d 777, 784–85 (Or. 1979).
But while the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision establishes what Oregon state libel law is, it is the judgments of the United States Supreme Court that are controlling on the First Amendment question. The United States Supreme Court has never held that the institutional press enjoys such extra rights.
All the federal courts of appeals that have considered this question have specifically held that the institutional press lacks any such extra rights. And the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United expressly closed the door that the earlier footnotes left open, making clear that a speaker’s First Amendment rights do not turn on whether she is a member of the institutional press."
David Aman - Tonkon Torp - Leon Simson - Kevin Padrick - Obsidian Finance Group - Summit Bankruptcy Trustee. Tonkon Torp Law Firm. Obsidian Renewableshttp://www.kevinpadrick.com/ - Outback Solar - David Brown. Miller Nash, Sussman Shank, Steven Hedberg, Perkins Coie, Judge Randall Dunn, Susan Ford, Tom Stilley, Pamela Griffith, Bankruptcy Corruption, Oregon Bankruptcy Courts, Portland Oregon Corruption, Shield Laws, Retraction Laws, Free Speech, First Amendment.
Investigative Blogger Crystal L. Cox has Some Questions for the FBI, the Department of Justice and anyone out there who actually provides any kind of Monitoring of the Bankruptcy Courts or in any way Enforces the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
Certainly Judge Dunn, the Bankruptcy Judge in this case,knew that Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance Group was under contract with Obsidian to Advise them- there were press releases from Sussman Shank Attorney Susan Ford that discussed Obsidian being on board, the attorneys of the Principals knew that "Obsidian" was on board as you see in the transcription of the meeting BEFORE Kevin Padrick showed up to that Summit Meeting. Is Judge Dunn Liable ? Will the Oregon Tax Payers end up paying a huge settlement when possible the Summit Creditors Sue Judge Dunn Personally and Professionally?
Why did a Federal Bankruptcy Judge appoint what looks to me like a legally defined "Insider" as a Trustee" It makes no legal or ethical sense to me and is certainly not of the highest fiduciary duty. I would say in my OPINION that Judge Dunn has some serious Explaining to do and possible some Lawsuits of his own to face.
I am not claiming I know Law, thing is Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) sure seems to me to be suggesting that as a legally defined Insider, under contract to advise the Debtor, that Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance Group was not legally allowed to be "appointed" as the Trustee in the Summit Bankruptcy, I don't Know this for Fact, I am not a Bankruptcy Attorney. However, I will point you to some links of interest to do your own homework.
Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)
"(14) The term "disinterested person" means a person that--
(A) is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider;
(B) is not and was not, within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition, a director, officer, or employee of the debtor; and
(C) does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor, or for any other reason.
One thing that jumps out at me is property must be transferred to a "disinterested party" right?
And as above in the bankruptcy code we note the definition of "disinterested party" NOT an Insider, and Kevin Padrick was an "Insider" from the way I see it.
Wasn't Kevin Padrick in "control" of the "debtor" and thereby again an insider. He seemed to have advised them on all this BEFORE he was the Trustee working against them, is this Legal? Really?
See Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance Group had the debtors books, had spreadsheets on the Debtors Assets and Personal Financial Information and WAS an Insider, it seems to me. Therefore, In my Opinion, He had NO BUSINESS working for the Creditors in this Case nor being appointed as the Trustee, in my Opinion and the way I see the Laws, from my Non-Lawyer interpretation.
the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) ("insiders" include an 6 "officer","person in control of the debtor", "affiliate, or insider of an affiliate as if such affiliate were the debtor", and "managing agent of the debtor").
This talks about investigations in to debtors debt, see Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance Group already had this information in Great Detail, as he was an Insider, under contract "control" of the Debtors, yet he became Trustee and SEEMED to charge the estate to investigate what he was already paid to look into by the Summit Principals, his Client.
This is for the Courts to Decide and to Look at But I Certainly Do Raise the Question:
Can a Legally Defined "Insider" of the Debtor be Appointed
as a Trustee in a 40 Million Dollar Bankruptcy Case?
Also Note that Sussman Shank, Attorney for the Summit Principals did not object and seemed in fact to agree with Judge Dunn in appointing Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance when it looks like days before THIS SAME Attorney, Sussman Shank's Lead Attorney Susan Ford said in an email to Steven Hedberg of Perkins Coie (Lead Attorney for the Creditors Committee who at one time worked under Kevin Padrick at Miller Nash), to Tom Stilley (Assistant Attorney for Sussman and Shank), to Jeanette Thomas ( Perkins Coie Attorney for Creditors' Committee), and to Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance Group that """There was significant concern that such a proposal would be "dead on arrival" and might even lead to a Motion by the UST to appoint a Trustee, which would not benefit the creditors.""
So what happened, who is liable, where is the highest fiduciary duty ?
So they ALL knew that he Was Legally Defined in Bankruptcy Code as an Insider and yet they all looked the other way, why? And if not illegal then certainly they should be filed against with the Oregon State Bar as an Ethics Violation Right? And this case involves victims (Creditors and Investors) in multiple states, who is really liable? Accountable? I would say to start the Victims need to sue the Department of Justice and those personally involved in the oversight duties of the Summit Bankruptcy in which Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance Group was allegedly to answer to.
Also think about this, as thought to consider, it is Tax Code, in a 1031 Exchange that Property, such as the Assets and LLC's involved in the Summit Bankruptcy that this be transferred to a "Disinterested Party" which it SEEMS that by Law Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance Was not. So is this a Violation of Tax Code regarding 1031 Exchanges?
Why did Kevin Padrick bill the Summit Creditors for a meeting with Steve Hedberg (Lead Attorney for the Creditors Committee who at one time worked under Kevin Padrick at Miller Nash), and Tom Stilley (Assistant Attorney for Sussman and Shank) to discuss replacing Terry Vance as CRO? This can be seen discussed in Judicial Proceeding Case No. 08-37031 rld11in Billable Hours.
Terry Vance was doing a fine job, from all I have read and Susan Ford Lead Attorney with Sussman Shank was allegedly out of town when Tom Stilley, Sussman Shank was involved in this. So, was Tom Stilley Connected in any Conflict of Interest Ways?
Why did Sussman Shank agree, knowing full well that Kevin Padrick was Legally Defined as an Insider by way of Contract with the Summit Principals to work for them?
All Oregon Law that May have Been Broken, and ALL Bankruptcy Code Broken I hope to find and Post - have a Tip ? Crystal@CrystalCox.com - the Department of Justice is NOT looking, the FBI says they don't know bankruptcy code, the Bankruptcy Judge says he has no Jurisdiction, so the only HOPE that the Public, the Victims have is Transparency, and Exposing ALL the Details piece by piece to the best of my ability in being as truthful as I possible can. If you see something not truthful, please email the proof of why and I will retract it.
For More Information on the Summit 1031 Bankruptcy Go To
"Apparently, the Trustee believes that he somehow is not required to comply with the provisions of the Operating Agreement or Oregon law."
"E-MAIL TO:
DAVID AMAN
June 26, 2009
Re: Klondike Point, LLC
David:
This e‑mail is in response to your June 23, 2009 e‑mail to me with respect to Klondike Point, LLC (“Klondike”). I will respond, by separate e‑mail, to your comments regarding Century Drive Mobile Home Park, LLC.
By this e‑mail, we address (i) the management rights asserted by Liquidating Trustee Kevin Padrick (“Trustee”) with respect to Klondike, and (ii) the Trustee’s ignoring the offer made by Stephanie Studebaker to purchase the Trustee’s interests in Klondike.
Trustee’s Purported Management Rights. By your e‑mail, on behalf of the Trustee, you provide to me a copy of a Memorandum of Action of the Members of Klondike, purporting to remove the Managers of Klondike and appointing the Trustee as the Manager of Klondike, and purporting to terminate my law firm as counsel for Klondike.
The Trustee’s actions in this regard are improper, and violate the provisions of the Operating Agreement of Klondike, as well as applicable Oregon law.
Ms. Studebaker and Barbara Tyler are the duly-appointed and acting Managers of Klondike, in accordance with the provisions of the Operating Agreement of Klondike. Ms. Studebaker has acted as a Manger of Klondike since January 1, 2005, and Ms. Tyler has acted as a Manager of Klondike since January 1, 2009.
Klondike acknowledges that, pursuant to an order entered by the Bankruptcy Court in the Summit Chapter 11 case, Brian Stevens, Mark Neuman and Tim Larkin (collectively, “Summit Members”) transferred to the Summit estate their interests in Klondike.
The effect of the Summit Members’ transfer of their interests in Klondike is very clear: they were able to transfer to the Summit estate only their economic interests in Klondike, and not any management rights or other rights as members of Klondike. In this regard, please take note of the following:
Section 8.1 of the Operating Agreement provides that any transfer of a member’s interest in Klondike is “prohibited,” and that no member may transfer his interest in Klondike.
Section 8.3.1 of the Operating Agreement provides that the transferee of a member’s interest will not be admitted as a substitute member without the unanimous written consent of the non‑transferring members. Such consent has not been obtained by the Trustee, and will not be given either by Ms. Studebaker or by Ms. Tyler.
Oregon law is clear that the Summit Members’ transfer of their interests to the Trustee allows the Trustee to have recourse only to the members’ economic interests in Klondike, and that the Trustee does not become, as a result of such transfer, a member in Klondike or obtain any right to participate in the governance of Klondike. See, O.R.S. 63.259 (“Rights of judgment creditor against a member.
On application to a court of competent jurisdiction by any judgment creditor of a member, the court may charge the membership interest of the member with payment of the unsatisfied amount of the judgment with interest. To the extent so charged, the judgment creditor has only the rights of an assignee of the membership interest.”).
The Trustee has no greater rights with respect to Klondike than he has under the Operating Agreement and under applicable Oregon law. See, Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
Pursuant to Section 4.2 of the Operating Agreement, a Manager for Klondike may be elected and removed by a vote of members owning not less than 60% of the ownership interests in Klondike. By the Memorandum of Action, the Trustee asserts that he holds 63.32% of the ownership interests in Klondike, and, accordingly, that he is entitled to appoint himself as Manager.
As set forth hereinabove, pursuant to the Operating Agreement and governing Oregon law, the Trustee has no right to vote the interests that were assigned to him by the Summit Members.
However, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Trustee were entitled to vote the interests of the Summit Members, the Trustee still would not have the requisite votes to appoint himself as the Manager of Klondike.
While it may be correct that the Summit Members had at one point an aggregate of 63.32% of the ownership interests in Klondike, they no longer have such ownership interests.
By reason of the Summit Members’ failure to make required capital contributions, as of April 30, 2009, the Summit Members had only 58.07% of the ownership interests in Klondike, and Ms. Studebaker and Ms. Tyler had 41.93% of the ownership interests in Klondike.
Transmitted for your review is a chart, prepared by Ms. Studebaker, setting forth the ownership interest changes that occurred by reason of the Summit Members’ failure to make the required capital contributions.
Based upon the foregoing, pursuant to the Operating Agreement, the Trustee is not entitled to vote as a member of Klondike, and is not entitled to exercise any management rights under the Operating Agreement.
Governing Oregon law is consistent with this result. Moreover, even if the Trustee had the right to participate in the governance of Klondike ‑‑ and he does not ‑‑ he does not control the percentage of ownership interests in Klondike necessary to appoint himself Manager. The Trustee’s attempt to seize control of management of Klondike, therefore, is blatantly improper, violates the rights of the members of Klondike, and is ineffective.[1]
Trustee’s Improper Disregard of Purchase Offer. As pointed out in my June 3, 2009 letter to Leon Simson of your office, the Summit Members’ failure to make capital contributions required pursuant to Section 3.3 of the Operating Agreement constitutes a “cessation event” pursuant to Section 9.1(e) of the Operating Agreement.
Moreover, pursuant to Section 9.1(g) of the Operating Agreement, the Summit Members’ bankruptcies, as such term is defined in O.R.S. 63.001(3) (“bankruptcy” includes a member’s “seeking, consenting to or acquiescing in the appointment of a trustee, receiver or liquidator of the member or of all or any substantial part of the member’s properties”) also constitutes a cessation event.
Pursuant to Section 9.3 of the Operating Agreement, upon the occurrence of a cessation event as to a member of Klondike, the remaining members of Klondike may elect to purchase the units owned by the affected members on the terms set forth in Section 9.5 of the Operating Agreement, at 80% of the value of such units, in accordance with the valuation procedures established by Section 9.4 of the Operating Agreement.
As set forth in my June 3, 2009 e‑mail to Mr. Simson, in accordance with the provisions of Sections 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5 of the Operating Agreement, in April 2009, Ms. Studebaker sent to the Summit Members an offer to purchase their respective interests in Klondike (“Purchase Offer”).
On April 20, 2009, Ms. Studebaker’s counsel sent to Mr. Simson, by overnight mail, a copy of Purchase Offer. By the Purchase Offer, Ms. Studebaker provided to the Trustee extensive information regarding the subject real property and regarding Klondike’s financial affairs in order to facilitate the Trustee’s ability to evaluate the fairness of the Purchase Offer.
By the Purchase Offer, Ms. Studebaker offered to purchase the Summit Members’ interests for an amount in excess of any legitimate valuation of such interests. Ms. Studebaker’s offer is a fair offer and should be pursued by the Trustee for the benefit of the Summit creditors.
For the past several months, Ms. Studebaker has continued to act diligently, and in accordance with the provisions of the Operating Agreement, to purchase the interests of the Summit Members which have been transferred to the Trustee.
While the Trustee received Ms. Studebaker’s Purchase Offer more than two months ago, he has not bothered to even respond to her Purchase Offer. Moreover, he has not bothered to respond substantively to my June 3, 2009 e‑mail to Mr. Simson, requesting the Trustee’s cooperation, in accordance with the provisions of the Operating Agreement, regarding the Purchase Offer.
Instead, the Trustee has chosen to employ this brazen “power play,” asserting rights to which he clearly is not entitled under the Operating Agreement or under Oregon law.
Apparently, the Trustee believes that he somehow is not required to comply with the provisions of the Operating Agreement or Oregon law.
The Trustee’s blatant disregard of the rights of the Klondike members will not be tolerated by them. We hereby demand that the Trustee cause you to rescind your June 23, 2009 e‑mail and to acknowledge that Ms. Studebaker and Ms. Tyler continue to act as the Managers of Klondike. We demand further that the Trustee address Ms. Studebaker’s Purchase Offer, in accordance with the requirements of the Operating Agreement.
If the Trustee does not respond to this e‑mail by July 2, 2009, Klondike will consider pursuing all appropriate remedies against the Trustee. The Trustee then will have an opportunity to explain to the Bankruptcy Court why he apparently is intent on exceeding his duties as a trustee and on ignoring opportunities to maximize the value of estate assets, to the detriment of the Summit creditors, and to justify to the Bankruptcy Court and to the Summit creditors the value of his services in this regard.
Robert E. Opera
REO:pbw
[1] I recall that, when the issue of the Trustee’s rights and remedies, as the transferee of the Summit Members’ interests, was raised before the Bankruptcy Court at the April 30, 2009 hearing on the Trustee’s motion to expedite the hearing on his summary judgment motion, the Bankruptcy Court acknowledged, in clear and unequivocal terms, the validity of Klondike’s position regarding the limited rights obtained by the Trustee as a result of such transfer. The Trustee’s acts, then, are directly inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Court’s comments."
Note from Investigative Blogger Crystal L. Cox, I have been writing on this case from the begining, I believe that the Public has a right to know what goes on in the bankruptcy courts and the victims involved have a right to transparency in all aspects of how THEIR MONEY is being used by the Bankruptcy Trustee.
This is an "after the fact" situation, whereby a company goes bankrupt and the victims that lose money then seem to have no rights. This bankruptcy was a bit different in a way of it involve a large amount of people in many states, and they were mostly just people, vs companies and vendors which are usually involved in a bankruptcy. This was a 1031 Exchange Company in which had the money of many real estate investors, this was their life's savings, life's work and after the bankruptcy filing the money was in the control of Kevin Padrick, Bankruptcy Trustee as far as I understand it.
My goal was to get the details of this case found as there was an insider who had, has an amazing blog with lots of inside documents and there was a legal proceeding filed to object to the outrageous fees the trustee was charging the estate. I wanted to get this story heard and yes I formulated my own opinion along the way of the incredible, shocking events that transpired.
Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance Group hired the same attorney in that blog, same attorney that deposed those in the Summit Bankruptcy and from Tonkon Torp in which was named in the legal proceeding (Objection to Fees) in which I had been writing on, Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance Group hired David Aman to Sue me for Defamation for a blog post in which Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance Group nor David Aman of Tonkon Torp ever asked me to remove nor provided information to whether Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance Group paid the deferred gain on Klondike Point and Century Drive, which was all they had to do. Ask me to change or drop the post, show me ANY evidence as to why and I certainly would have, this NEVER happened.
So they sued me in January of 2011, and now my Trial is at the End of Nov. 2011, and All I did was tell the story of other people. And post a link to that blog for tons more information for the reader to look into. It is my believe that Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance Group simply wanted to silence my blogs as I am very good at Search Engine Marketing and use this talent to get victims heard and to expose possible corruption in the court system.
Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance Group and David Aman of Tonkon Torp, IN MY OPINION have harassed me non-stop for over 10 months, and the point seems to be simply to own my blogs and to stop me from talking about this story that is not my story, just because I have the ability to take other people's story to the top of the search engines.
Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance Group already lost most of this case in a Summary Judgement, I am legally allowed to talk about this story, and yet Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance Group and his attorneys still want me to agree to stop posting and want blogs from me that are my intellectual property, and simply because I write on this story that they don't want you to know.
The Facts of this case are is the Blog Post True or Defamation, do I have a First Amendment write to have posted that blog post? The remedy was easy long ago to simply provide a request to remove the post and to provide factual reasons to do so. However instead Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance Group and David Aman their attorney seemed to think that wasting tax pay money, and filing frivolous 10 Million Dollar Lawsuits was a better way to go. Even though there seems to be no basis in actual law to have done so nor to continue doing so.
The Summit 1031 Bankruptcy still has tons of unanswered questions in my Opinion, however for now WE simply want to know did Kevin Padrick of Obsidian Finance Group pay the deferred gain or not? IS the information in that post True of Not? Does Crystal L. Cox, investigative blogger have a right to have posted this information on her blog or Not?
